Home / Docs

Security model

Release v0.4.0

Every guarantee has the form: the implementation satisfies its specification, assuming the trusted base behaves as specified and the stated assumptions hold. una report lists four zones for every build:

Zone Contents Who is responsible
Proven Type safety, confinement of effects and capabilities, information-flow noninterference (termination-insensitive), refinements and contracts The compiler and the verifier
Trusted The compiler, the interpreter and the native runtime, the SMT solver, the standard library, trusted modules, host capabilities, the key that authenticates the proof cache Una maintainers and module owners
Assumed The behavior of external systems as declared in capability signatures Capability authors
Human That requirements and contracts capture the intent Requirement owners and reviewers

Proven means discharged by the checker and the Z3 solver, relative to the verifier's encoding, and an obligation the solver cannot decide is an error (U5002), never a pass. Noninterference and type safety are enforced by the checker's rules; the formal model in Lean proves them for a fragment of the language only, and una check does not run that re-check on your package (Known limits, docs/security/tcb.md).

Every report lists what is outside the model, among them: timing, termination and resource side channels, and the behavior of external systems beyond their declared signatures. Una proves conformance to an explicit specification, not that the specification says the right thing.

A few principles of the design:

Information flow: guarantee and scope

From spec/07 §1.

Una enforces termination-insensitive noninterference up to declassification (theorem T6, spec/10 §6): for any observer at label l, two runs whose inputs differ only in values labeled above l produce the same values and effects observable at l, unless a declassification policy released information to l.

Observable channels in the model: return values, failure variants and payloads, capability operation arguments, the occurrence of effects.

Outside the model in v0.1, and reported as such in the build report (spec/13 §6, out_of_model): timing, termination and divergence, resource consumption and allocation, stack exhaustion, external systems beyond declared signatures, races between the check and the use of a file path, hard links, order of effects across concurrent tasks, the time of a host stop, interference of the host's load with the timing of an expression, uncatchable termination, waits at limits and at start, and which branch of first of wins, beyond its label (spec/14 §3 and ADR 0048 for hard links; v0.2, ADR 0065 and spec/19 §3 for the order of effects, which includes how far a canceled task got; edition 0.4 preview, ADR 0116 rule 21 and spec/26 §6 for the time of a host stop, the interference of the host's load and uncatchable termination, and ADR 0117 rule 13 and spec/27 §6, §7 and §9 for the waits at start and at the limits of grants, and the winner of first of). T6 holds for the result of a together block and for each task's own events. A run-time abort is termination: running out of depth or memory (U6003), in v0.2 a header value with a control character (U6004), and host text that is not valid UTF-8 (U6005, S-16, ADR 0086).

Reporting a vulnerability

See Reporting a vulnerability.

Security advisories

The security issues fixed in published releases: Security advisories.